This article follows some tracks of an animal (the bear) 
The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded her the sum of 50£.
The jurisprudential meaning of the bear
I want to pause for a moment on something of the jurisprudential context for this case. The purpose with which I want to approach it is obviously not purely expository and doctrinal, nor simply as a matter of recounting a certain historical curiosity. The question that I want in some way to elicit, using this case as a cue, is a question that rather concerns the meaning that the bear has in jurisprudence. What, if anything, is the significance of this animal -the bear -as it appears in law and juridical knowledge? An attention to the meaning of the animal, in a field that is too often quick to look for normative abstractions, is not a simple task. An animal is something that finds itself easily alienated in the conceptual language of law. In trying to describe the meaning that an animal has in a juridical sense then, one tends to run the risk of leaving it with only the vaguest relation to the figure it otherwise casts, often more vividly, in our imagination. This bear is soon caught under the shapeless figure that technical categories tend to construct in the world of legal principle.
At the same time however, the task that I have described seems to bring with it also something of the reverse difficulty. To speak about the juridical meaning of the bear is to tread precariously in a rhetorical field that, revelling in representation and figuration, treats the legal meaning as only a subset of our moral, ethical and literary perceptions and sensibilities. From this perspective, one finds cultural depictions of the bear only too readily, and is tempted to treat these elaborate depictions, whether they enter into legal discourse or not, as though they provide the more meaningful subject of analysis. We cannot of course expect jurisprudence to simply mirror these images that we find in a number of discursive settings: fictional or non-fictional. It is noteworthy for example -although far from surprising -the lengths that are gone to by the parties and some of the other witnesses in Besozzi v Harris ('Besozzi'), from what one can glean from the record, to present the bear in a favourable, if exaggerated light. 6 But even where these rhetorical representations are accepted as evidence by the court, what they give us is not much more than an appeal to a popular affective conception of the animal fitted awkwardly to the juridical register: here whether the animal has a characteristically 'fierce' or 'tame' nature and thus whether the defendant can be said to have committed any civil wrong. Whatever the institutional setting and however far we take the analysis, there is nothing necessarily jurisprudential in these elastic figurations by which the parties to legal action attempt to describe the nature of the bear that has occasioned some kind of harm.
Like the injuries that it has inflicted, the viciousness or tameness of the bear can so easily be manipulated in language to suit the parties' attempts to establish the lawful responsibility of the other.
If however one starts from a different angle and asks instead what meaning this animal acquires, not just in the sometimes hyperbolic discourse that enters the courtroom, but rather in the jurisprudence (the thought of law) itself that attempts to hold as closely as possible to the form in which one makes or defends a claim, then the answers -if one finds them within certain doctrinal limits -cannot afford to be so elastic. One does not craft a specific meaning for the bear in law in the same way one crafts a literary meaning. Even where we say that this juridical craft has an inherently 'fictional' character, 'legal fiction' is not a figurative or metaphorical exercise, but a 6 The following humorous exchange from the court scene recorded in some of the newspaper accounts, attests to something of this embellishment around the meaning and nature of the animal. A witness named Samuel Baker (a farmer) was called upon to testify to the good character of the bear. He said that it was given to his father and 'used to run about the farm, eating with the calves and pigs, and was always gentle. The children used to ride it, and cried when it was given to Mr Harris in exchange for a dog.' After noting that it had been imported from Russia by his brother, counsel for the plaintiff (Mr Edlin) seized upon this fact: 'Mr Edlin: Then it was a rugged Russian bear! Witness (indignantly): No, it was not. Mr Edlin: Why, you say he came from Russia. Witness: But he was not a rough 'un. (Laughter.) The Judge: The learned counsel suggests that he was a ruffian. (Renewed laughter.) The plaintiff's counsel Mr Prideaux also then observed facetiously that it must have been 'a real gem of a bear' to fit the glowing descriptions provided by the defendant's wife and daughter. London Daily News, April 12, 1858, p 6.
The bear in the common law of civil liability for animals
To begin this exploration, it is useful to take a further step back from the case of Besozzi and to focus on the development of the law relating to civil liability for animals more generally in which the case finds its context. The common law regarding liability for animals that inflict injury on individuals evolved ostensibly through the writ and action that came to be known in England as scienter. form of action only applied where an animal was in some way directly incited by its owner to attack another and which caused damage vi et armis -that is, effectively with 'force and arms' 10 -the animal being essentially an extension of the individual's intent to unlawfully interfere with property or person. The other shape that it took however -and through which the modern law of scienter was derived -was through the 'action on the case' where the act of the defendant -not necessarily having directly incited his animal to do harm -nevertheless was responsible for having 'knowingly kept' an animal that was in the habit of doing harm. This form, traceable to an action used first in a plea roll of 1387, frames the action as 'Quare quendam canem ad mordendum aves consuetum apud A. scienter retinuit...' ('Where A knowingly kept a dog accustomed to biting birds...'). This form was then easily transposable for other animal couplets such as horse -bull, pig -boar etc. and of course also to damage caused by an animal to a human being (e.g. 'Where A knowingly kept a boar accustomed to biting humans...'). The plaintiff could recover damages from the defendant who had knowledge of the injurious propensity of his animal and who nonetheless kept it in a way that failed to prevent it from doing harm to another.
Modern authors including most notably
One of the difficulties in the early interpretation of the principle was the extent of the required knowledge. According to the strict reading, the action was brought simply for having 'knowingly kept' the animal. Was it enough then to prove simply that the defendant kept the animal (i.e. not unknowingly) and that it was accustomed to bite? Or was it rather necessary in addition to prove knowledge on the part of the keeper of this specific propensity? In the case of Kinnion v Davies (1637), as Williams relates, a declaration was held invalid because of what was seen as an error in the formulation. 11 Later cases had allowed it nevertheless on the basis of its conventional use and on the basis that 'knowingly' could theoretically refer to all of the foregoing requirements in the writ including the propensity to bite etc. 12 To speak of 'unknowingly' keeping an animal would be a meaningless defence in comparison to the more pertinent idea that the keeper did not know that the animal had a vicious inclination. The prevalence of this interpretation, as we know from Besozzi, ended up making the bear an exception to the principle -it being enough to have simply kept the bear knowingly, but not enough to have simply kept an otherwise well-behaved dog, pig etc.
Williams found scant evidence to suggest that scienter (knowledge) was not a real, rather than fictitious, element of the early action. as Peter North observes, has 'undoubtedly created new problems of interpretation [especially] relating to liability for dangerous animals'. 23 It replaced the pre-existing common law in relation to ferae naturae by stating simply that anyone who is a keeper of an animal that belongs to a 'dangerous species' is liable for 'any damage' caused by it. 24 A dangerous species is defined as a species that is not commonly domesticated in the British Islands and which would normally have such characteristics that would make it likely, unless restrained, to cause 'severe damage', or that any damage it may cause is likely to be severe. 25 The Act thus at the very least removed ambiguity that may have still existed after Besozzi and Wyatt over whether strict liability was to apply to a bear that was ostensibly 'tame' and/or reasonably restrained, and also to the situation where the animal may have caused a kind of damage that is unrelated to its supposed 'dangerous' nature, such as if a hypothetical bear had not attacked per se but simply brought and stirred up a hive of bees in the vicinity of a susceptible visitor.
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What else if anything has changed with respect to the judicial meaning of the bear with these reforms? Regardless of how far we are willing to follow Williams in his modernist spirit, one cannot ignore the simple fact that the animal takes on quite a different status in these various juridical renditions. In jurisdictions in which the general law of negligence has been allowed to supersede the old scienter action for instance, the presence of the animal, its nature, past behaviour and the way it is kept quite obviously still remain important factors in determining whether a defendant may be liable for an attack. What is different is that these elements arise with no more juridical specificity than any other risk or accident that an individual must take steps to guard against in order to fulfil their civil duty in relation to their 'neighbour'. Though very little may have changed substantially from the perspective of a plaintiff or defendant in this regard in terms of the norms that determine liability, a lot has changed nevertheless from the perspective of what place and meaning the animal has in jurisprudence. In scienter, the animal is not the same as it is in negligence, merely one inessential circumstance in a wider act (a neglect of one's civil duties) considered wrongful at law:
rather, according to the form in which the claim is made, it is the very element that legally defines the act's wrongfulness. The bear -which under one formulation of the claim it is wrong to have 'knowingly kept' -is not the same as the bear that, like anything that can cause some foreseeable harm, informs the abstract duty that civil law imposes on a person to take reasonable care.
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The difference is no less significant when one considers the legislative rendition of the law which in the UK at least mirrors that of the pre-existing common law treatment. The Act retains the attention on the nature of the animal which it continues to classify according to its 'dangerousness' and its likelihood of causing 'severe damage'. But what is easily left out of the picture is the change to the animal that attends the shift in juridical form. As a legislative instrument, the Act can only establish the general category: that of 'dangerous animals' into which various species can supposedly be fitted by definition. From this perspective, a bear for the purposes of the Act has no greater or lesser significance than a member of a wide range of species including a viper or a funnel-web spider for instance, presuming each of these could be considered to be likely to cause 'severe' damage. 28 But while the legislative arrangement takes us from the general category to the particular species that either falls within or outside its parameters, what it excludes is the juridical movement that has taken us rather in something of the opposite direction, that is starting from the otherwise unclassifiable presence of the specific animal (a bear, a lion ... etc.) -to the idea of the dangerous animal (ferae) as an exception to the principle of scienter in common law -to the juridical categorization of any possible animal in terms of its dangerousness.
If these observations reveal nothing else, it is that one should not neglect the changing shape given to the juridical meaning of the animal through reforms that appear to otherwise leave the normative, moral and economic figures and rationalities effectively intact. What the bear is capable of doing in law and to law is not always the same as what the legal text describes it as capable of doing. Left here, the analysis gives us reason at least to be wary of attempts that, for the sake of doctrinal simplicity, abandon the meaning of the bear to a kind of juridical abstraction. In the following section, I want to consider one particular non-juridical work of scholarship with the hope 27 We see both of these formulations together in Besozzi as well as in Wyatt where there were strong suggestions by the defendants in either case that the plaintiffs had negligently brought the harm upon themselves. It is the same inherent viciousness of the animal for instance that on the one hand makes the defendant liable for having kept it (despite believing it to be tame) as that which would make the plaintiff responsible for (unknowingly) having walked directly into its path. The only thing that differs is the juridical form: the bear that for the defendant has a strict doctrinal status in scienter is for the plaintiff merely a contingent factual circumstance. 28 The Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 (UK) also provides a lengthy schedule of animals for which it is an offence to keep without a licence and, as with equivalent laws in most other common law jurisdictions that regulate the keeping of 'dangerous' or 'exotic' animals, includes bears (Ursidae The statuette, about twenty centimetres high, has two separate figures facing one another. On the one side the figure of a woman, seated and robed, 'graciously holding the fruits of field and tree, barley, plums and apples'
as Bachofen described, wearing a small diadem. 34 On the other side the figure of a bear which stands on all fours, mouth slightly open and, as one author puts it, 'slinks up to its mistress ... and seems to cause her some embarrassment by its affectionate forwardness'. 35 Just behind the hind legs of the bear is a small tree whose branches appear to twist up and over the arched back of the bear, holding only a few leaves and a blossom. The pedestal on which each of these figures stands has the inscription: DEAE ARTIONI / LICINIA SABINILLA (To the goddess Artio from Licinia Sabinilla).
It is a rare artefact, we are told, not just because of its age -dating to the late second century ADbut also for the exquisite craftsmanship and for the rarity of the figure of the bear in monuments of this type.
The approach that Bachofen was to bring to reading this artefact is one that was quite unique and which corresponded in many respects to the approach he had taken in some of his earlier work on mortuary symbolism such as 'The Three Mystery Eggs' and 'Ocnus the Rope Plaiter', 36 where the author attempted to unravel not just the symbolism in the ancient work of art, but to reconstruct the materiality of the symbol in order to more intimately appreciate the ingenuity of its particular use and the modification made to it in the thought of the artist. Bachofen's study in Der Baer is no exception to this distinctive approach. It is not an attempt to reduce the thought of the artist somehow to the system -whether ideological, religious, linguistic or cosmological -that would provide the present-day key to its interpretation. Rather, assuming a profound and creative idea to be expressed in the immediate artefact in which the bear appears so prominently, he traces a kind of loop that takes us from the simple presence of this particular item, down to the deepest resonances of the symbol depicted in ancient thought, and then back again to the immediate work of art with a renewed appreciation for the originality, singularity and inventiveness of its existence. 'No single phenomenon is able to unveil entirely the thought of other times,' he wrote in the introduction to his study. 'In the end, all we can do is take each symbol in isolation. mere attribute: originally it stands on its own power and has a definite meaning there. It's in this that it is initially recognized; the cult association with various deity figures can only be analysed secondarily. I've undertaken this study of the bear upon these fundamentals.' 37 Bachofen attempted to understand the meaning of the bear then not by starting with the figurative attributes that would see it worshipped, represented, personified etc., but first of all -as he suggested -in its independence and isolation, i.e. as the animal itself rather than through the qualities that it offers for anthropomorphic representation. Only from that perspective would it be possible to assign a definite meaning to the animal and to assess the way in which it appears and is used as an element of thought. The text of Der Baer goes on to provide an extensive analysis and meticulous catalogue of the appearances of the bear in ancient and classical art, literature, mythology and religion: an exploration as Bachofen described it of 'the inner connection of all individual phenomena of bears, how they confront us in the testimonies and monuments of antiquity, [in order] to determine and so to present how at the same time the unity of the basic idea and the diversity of its expression among various peoples and in various times duly come forth.' 38 Bachofen thought that there was a 'definite meaning' for the bear that was evident in the material he analysed -material ranging from myth, natural science, poetry, archaeology, art, philosophyand that that meaning was motherhood in its ethical and nurturing aspect. The most salient image that Bachofen saw in this material, and one that seemed to recur in ancient works, is that of the mother bear who gives shape and form to its young through licking. The newborn bear -which supposedly at birth barely resembles anything of its adult form -will emerge into its proper state only with the effort of licking: an effort that expresses and symbolizes the mother's care. It was not in the idea of motherhood as the sign of fertility then that Bachofen saw the bear, but rather in the idea of the mother who with infinite care and dedication, nurtures, trains and gives perfect shape to her young. 39 The quote that Bachofen drew upon from Horapollo, speaking of ancient animal symbolism, provides: 'When they would symbolise a man born deformed at first, but that has afterwards acquired his proper shape, they delineate a pregnant bear, for it brings forth (a mass of) thick and condensed blood, which is afterwards endued with life by being warmed between its thighs, and perfected by being licked with its tongue.' 40 'If Horapollo seems to limit these thoughts to a youth which is misshapen,' Bachofen added, 'like one with physical birth defects, then he lends 37 Bachofen, Der Baer, p 4. All translations of this text are the authors own. 38 Bachofen, Der Baer, p 40. 39 Bachofen, Der Baer, p 8. 40 Horapollo, Hieraglyphica 2, 83 quoted in Bachofen, Der Baer, p 5.
because it is linked not only to the general idea of birth but especially to that artistic perfection, that with which she lends all the products of the Earth, plants, animals, humans her wonderful beauty, and is also distinctly present in Rhea's fingers, the Idaean dactyli and digiti.' In Greek mythology, it is the hands of Rhea that, as the expression of motherly devotion, supposedly both hides her infant child Zeus in a cave on Mount Ida as well as with which she presents his father Cronos with a stone wrapped in swaddling cloth which he duly swallows instead of his own son. The Idaean Dactyloi ('fingers') which Bachofen mentions, were supposed to have arisen from the nymph Anchiale when she grasps the earth with her hands in the Dictaen cave, but are intimately linked with Rhea through having an autochthonous generation and as being invoked along with Rhea on the 'Mount of Bears' where the Argonauts made tribute to the mother of gods so that she would allow them safe conditions to set sail. formulation, but also as the principle that the soil was to predominate over the seed in terms of the ownership of produce and in the rule that a slave -being outside the patriarchal civil law -was to take her status from the mother, leaving the status of the father as inconsequential. 45 Der Baer rehearses many of these same allusions to an age of maternal right, of which the ancient bear-cults seemed to express for the thinker a primary ethical aspect: the principle by which the first extension of love beyond the limits of the ego to another creature occurs through the mother.
More importantly perhaps, and despite all of the common allusions to the exaltation of motherhood that recur in these two texts, Der Baer seems to find a much more grounded path along which to trace this idea. There is no longer any grand thesis in Der Baer as there was in Das Mutterrecht.
There is no attempt, as he said in the latter, at arriving at 'increasingly universal principles'
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; rather just a small statuette and the animal, the bear that, in its isolation, looks up at us from a distant age.
Bachofen returned to the statuette, and armed with the multitude of clues that he had traced for the bear in the cultural and archaeological sources, allowed the reader to glimpse just a little more intimately the force of intimation and the solitary profoundness of thought belonging to the piece of artistry. Here, the anthropomorphic figurations of the bear seemed to fall away in favour of the more isolated meaning he recognized it acquiring in the thought of the one making the dedication.
With this in mind, Bachofen suggested, the 'name Artio and the independent animal-form seems 
Shaw v McCreary
An overly zealous attempt to 'apply' Bachofen's study to our analysis of the juridical literature on civil liability for bears may yield some unwarranted results. It would be somewhat impetuous for example to try to read the bear in Besozzi as the sign of a motherhood which, lost to the judicial reasoning, returns under the figure of the animal in a kind of allegorical arc. Bachofen's study allows us to see how the bear, not just as a figure or in a certain play of signification, but in its very independence as an animal, can be situated in the construction of a thought with a more or less precise and a more or less profound meaning. The method of arriving at this meaning was for the author as much an individual encounter than a concerted philological and jurisprudential inquiry.
But it would be to take the implication of this work too far to allow the meaning ascribed to the animal to become a token allowing us to bypass the sometimes sober doctrinal terrain on which the thought of law is embedded. While it is true that the presence of the bear, through the wounds with which it marks the sphere of civil relation, makes an important difference to the juridical formulation of liability, this difference is not something we can easily confine to a subjective level. What requires our elucidation is not the bear as it exists in the thought of the judge, as though in the thought of an artist, but rather as it exists in the thought of law itself: the jurisprudence whose creativity is exercised only on the heavy weight of legal principle.
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Allow me to return then to a third case from our repertoire of 19 th century common law scienter jurisprudence concerning bears which we may be able to approach with a renewed interest. In the property outright with full rights as a single individual or 'femme sole'. The trial judge had found that while an owner of property would normally be held liable for a ferocious animal (ferae naturae) that was kept on that premises, in this case the plaintiff was able to recover damages only from the husband who, the judge thought, was the sole person responsible for the animal and not the wife.
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The action against the wife was excluded on the basis that as a wife, she could not have been legally expected to object to her husband's wish to keep the bear on the property. This decision was then overturned on appeal to the Chancery Divisional Court which held that, as the owner of the property which according to the statute she 'might have, hold and enjoy free from her husband's control as if she were sole and unmarried', she was therefore also liable for the harm inflicted by the bear.
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Since legally she could have had the animal removed, and the statute said that she held the property as if she were unmarried, the Divisional Court held that the trial judge had erred in excluding her from liability.
There are two points about the meaning of the bear in this case that may shed some light on the jurisprudential situation. The first -to leave the obviously gendered question until later -is in relation to the legal principle concerning the 'escaping bear'. In the two common law cases that had gone before (Besozzi and Wyatt) the bear had made its attack while remaining confined on the defendants property: in Besozzi chained up, in Wyatt confined to a cage. However in Shaw, the bear had escaped this property and made its attack on the street. Each of the judges in the Divisional
Court upheld the scienter exception that damage caused by a wild animal such as a bear will bring liability for its keeper regardless of the latter's knowledge of its disposition. However the question of whether, by escaping from either the property of the wife or the possession and captivity of the husband, the animal could still be considered to be 'kept' as such or whether by doing so it had immediately regained its natural state of wildness and belonged to no-one, was not directly addressed. Boyd C seemed to answer the question with reference to the principle in Rylands v
Fletcher, a case which involved not an animal but water escaping from a reservoir. 52 By allowing a substance onto her property that if it had escaped from the property would be likely to cause Chamber in this case, had in fact reasoned in the opposite direction: going from the existence of strict liability for animals as one example of a number of areas of tort law recognising liability without a specific negligent act on the part of the defendant, to a broader principle which would by analogy cover this defendant's 'nonnatural' use of water on their property. Williams notes that principle that the mere escape of an animal does not put an end to liability could be since as established since Hale's time and was affirmed in the case of May v Burdett (1846) 9 QB 101 which involved a monkey. Williams, Liability for Animals, p 336. damage, the owner was according to this principle supposed to be held strictly liable. 53 As for the bear itself however, we can compare another, much older juridical approach in which it seems to come more distinctly to mind in the shaping of legal principle on the 'escaping' animal. Bernard
Jackson for instance draws our attention to an example from the Roman law of pauperies that helps reveal what may be at stake for the bear in a different set of shifting juridical registers. The Roman action for pauperies, which originated from the Twelve Tables (451 BCE) , and was in many respects an ancient equivalent to the English scienter writ, provided for remedy to be available to a person who had suffered harm caused by a four-footed animal through no specific legal fault of the defendant. 54 The remedies provided for by this action involved not just damages but also 'noxal surrender', i.e. handing over the animal itself, as a substitute for pecuniary reparation. Jackson figured that the action at least by the time that the classical jurist Ulpian was writing about it included 'four-footed' wild animals such as bears, notwithstanding the common ambiguity surrounding whether a bear can be said to stand on primarily four or on two feet. But since wild animals could not be owned as such, the Roman jurist provided the following clarification of the scope of the action using the example of an escaping bear: 'if a bear breaks loose and so causes harm, its former owner cannot be sued because he ceased to be owner as soon as the wild animal escaped. Accordingly, if I kill the bear, the corpse is mine.'
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When this passage came down to the compilers of Justinian's Digest however, whose task it was to reduce the mass of classical Roman jurisprudence to an enforceable code, they extrapolated from this bear a categorical exception for the pauperies action for all 'beasts wild by nature', leaving the example's more salient point -the fact of its 'breaking loose' -remaining in the text as an awkwardly uninstructive remnant. 56 Because of this, despite the intimation to the law regarding the ability to maintain property in wild animals, 57 we do not know for sure the precise meaning for the bear that Ulpian had intended in this passage. to address the original lacuna. In this way, they brought a class of animals that would otherwise have been inexplicably excluded from liability in one area, back in through a different avenue.
Whether this jurisprudential sequence would have been helpful to acknowledge in Shaw is beside the point. What is noticeable in both the situations is that the bear that we can presume to have appeared with a more isolated and instructive meaning in the classical jurisprudential literature, ended up with the move toward codification being transposed and obfuscated under a more general, less distinctive figure. And it is this that we also observe in Shaw when, rather than being the occasion for a jurisprudential clarification of the principle of the escaping animal as it must have been for Ulpian, whether onto streets or neighbouring land, the bear instead loses its juridical shape by seeming to need to be brought under a more amorphous analogy.
The second problem is somewhat more conspicuous. What, if anything, can we make of the obvious issue of gender in Shaw with respect to the bear? Immediately observable of course particularly on the part of the trial judge in the case is the evidence for a barely-concealed chauvinism of the time, one still holding both to a technically outdated legal situation where a woman's rights were not always considered separate from her husband's as well as to a misogynistic social prejudice which inaccurately assumed the wife to be subject one-sidedly to the wishes of her husband. Much could be said no doubt by bringing the social and historical contexts more clearly into focus. However, from the jurisprudential point of view, it would not be enough just to reveal the chauvinism that persists in the judgment or in the historical register more broadly. What the case reveals about the doctrinal connection that ties the presence of the bear to a certain gendered configuration of law is much more than just what appears as the prejudice of a lower court Canadian judge of the 1890s.
More specifically, from the point of view of the meaning of the bear and the law of civil liability, we see in this case again a momentary reversion to an older symbolic: one which places the matrimonial relation ahead of the patrimonial, the law of marital co-habitation ahead of the law of property and 59 Digest 21.1.39 the bear to the configurations of gender, matrimony and reparation: a phenomenon in which Bachofen himself thought that he recognized 'the oldest system of family law ... in its cultic legal basis' 68 and which has in more recent times captivated a number of scholars of ancient Athens. 69 Why was it, these scholars have asked, that before they could be married, the girls of Athens were supposedly required to 'play the bear' for the goddess Artemis? In Aristophanes' Old Comedy the Lysistrata (411 BCE), the chorus of aristocratic Athenian women sing a verse that makes mention of being involved in a rite known as the arkteia, where young girls called arktoi (bears) had 'played' or 'imitated' the bear for Artemis at Brauron, by donning or casting down the krokoton (saffron robe). 70 The mention of this ritual appears in the context of recounting a list of social or religious duties in a woman's life in Athens the precise meaning of which is shrouded in some mystery. 71 Ever since, by way of reparation, the daughters of the citizens of Athens had imitated the bear, gradually becoming tame, as she had, overcoming their latent wildness so that they could eventually go and live with a husband, without danger to either partner. closely imitating, not the bear but the goddess who, as virgin huntress, 'pursues and massacres the male she ought to marry'. 80 Despite another interpretation of this rite that has recently deemphasised the presence and significance of the bear, 81 from the juridical point of view we don't encounter the animal here in a neutral or ambiguous way. As the foundation myths seem to confirm -which from one perspective hold more than a superficial resemblance to the common law scienter scenarios we have already explored -the bear holds a meaning that is more certain than one for which any other wild animal would do. '[W]hether we wish to privilege the interpretation of the arkteia as a mimesis of a shebear's taming or of its sexual development as a mother,' Cherubini writes, 'what we would apparently find at Brauron in the sign of the bear is the successful conclusion of a rite after which the girl is able to occupy her place as a woman in human society.' 82 It appears to bring with it a jurisprudence that imagines and dramatises the recompense for a harm occasioned by the bear in terms of a debt that cannot be made good through the ordinary means available to the city statewhich would barely be able to place a value on the animal -but at the level of a sacrifice for which only the Athenian girls in their relation to marriage and to the goddess Artemis can experience through an imitation of the animal.
Bear-tracks in law: To be followed...
Bachofen notes about the passage in Lysistrata, that we cannot so much complain if it is only through the form of its satirical derision that the memory of the Attic bear-rites has not completely vanished. 83 One might say something similar of the juridical meaning of the bear which, in our attempt to follow its tracks more closely, we seem to encounter only through what the abstract form of positive law has subtracted from the picture. Nothing warrants us to bemoan the inadequacy of this legal literature when it presents the bear itself in a somewhat crude outline. Even in this inadequacy, the cold prudence of institutions, the sober attention to the procedural envelope, the care for the form and conduct of law that this literature preserves, gives us already a sensibility toward the animal the value of which is easy to overlook. If this animal has left distinct tracks for us
